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. Robinson LADB News Analyst In recent years, Chile has been hailed as an "economic miracle"
which demonstrates the virtues of the neo-liberal model of free market capitalism now sweeping
Latin America and much of the developing world. In this view, which has for the most part been
uncritically adopted by a host of academics, journalists, and policy makers, the Pinochet dictatorship
that ruled from 1973-1990 is criticized for its authoritarianism but credited for the "economic success
story," and Chile is now held up as a model for the rest of the Third World. Chile's new democratic
rulers are, if anything, more committed than their authoritarian predecessors to the free market
reforms. The administration of President Patricio Aylwin has sought not only to conform to the
model it inherited, but to deepen and extend it. Some observers, in fact, see the current period
as the third stage in implementation of the model. After the shock treatment of the 1970s and the
structural transformations of the 1980s, Aylwin's government is acting to consolidate the model
and give it political and social legitimacy. Alejandro Foxley, a vocal political opponent of Pinochet
who now serves as Aylwin's Finance Minister, recently asserted: "A country shows maturity when
it is capable of taking advantage of the positive experiences which others have implemented, even
when one doesn't like the government which implemented these measures. I respect technically
and professionally those who were in the previous government." How do these claims to an
unqualified "success story" hold up to an empirical test of the performance and development of
Chile's economy over the past two decades? What issues does such an analysis raise regarding the
viability of the neo-liberal model for developing nations? Recovery Disguised as Growth Those
who acclaim the "economic miracle" in Chile point to five key areas as "success stories" growth,
debt management, privatization, poverty management, and the development of a dynamic and
competitive export sector. The data on Chile's growth performance between 1973- 1990 is, in fact, not
very impressive. The country's GDP grew by an average of 3.9% annually during 1950-1972, dropped
to an average of 1.4% annually from 1974-1983, and averaged only 1.2% during the 1980s. Moreover,
as Pedro Vuskovic who served as economy minister for two years during the administration of
president Salvador Allende (1970-1973) points out in a recent study, Chilean economic growth
rates from 1974-1989, taken cumulatively, were considerably below the overall Latin American
annual average during this same period of 4%. Far from advancing, he notes, Chile receded in
comparison to Latin America as a whole. Moreover, Chile's growth has been highly cyclic, involving
several dramatic economic booms followed by equally dramatic crashes. The booms have been
held up as proof of the "miracle," but the conclusion is different when the booms and crashes are
factored together. For instance, the 1977 to 1980 boom, in which GDP growth rates averaged 8.5%
per year, was followed by a tailspin in 1981 and a total collapse in 1982 and 1983, which brought
unemployment up to a high of over 30% and shrunk the GDP by an incredible 14% in 1982 alone.
Strictly speaking, therefore, the economic booms that form the basis for the "miracle" didn't actually
contribute to growth at all, but to the recovery of previously achieved levels. Debt Management
and Privatization: Precarious Indicators Chile's alleged dexterous "debt management" is based on
its successful renegotiations in the late 1980s and on its perfect debt servicing record. However,
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this argument overlooks the fact that the Chilean government in the authoritarian period as well
as the last three years of democracy has been forced to manage a debt in the first place which it
accumulated mostly to increase imports of consumer goods destined for luxury consumption. This
debt totalled nearly US$20 billion in 1992, according to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB),
the highest per-capita level in the world. In other words, it was debt mis-management which, in
the first place, required an effort at debt management. Notwithstanding some debt reduction, the
argument also ignores the fact that renegotiations amounted mostly to exchanging bilateral debts
with other governments and commercial debt for new debts with multilateral lending institutions
such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the IDB. Multilateral debt grew
by about 40% per year, for an annual average of some $600 million, in the mid-1980s, which made
possible huge repayments to the private banks. As scholars James Petras and Steve Vieux note, this
multilateral debt will have to be completely repaid, cannot be restructured, and cannot continue to
increase indefinitely. Moreover, debt servicing has meant a permanent drain from the country of
newly generated wealth. In the late 1980s debt servicing was consuming an astounding 5% of the
country's annual economic output, according to Vuskovic. Considering that growth during the 1980s
averaged 1.2% per year, we are left with a dramatic net outflow of wealth from Chile during low
years and a much more modest accumulation of wealth within the country than the actual growth
rates would suggest during the top growth years. It is true that Chile has maintained a perfect
payment record in its debt servicing, which makes it perhaps the most creditworthy country in
Latin America a valuable asset given Latin America's extreme reliance on commercial, bilateral, and
multilateral international financial networks during the 1980s and 1990s. However, in light of the
overall performance analysis, it is best to describe Chile's perfect debt servicing record as a "success
story" for the commercial banks that have been able to recover principal and interest intact from
Chile even while they suffered losses elsewhere, and to reserve judgement as to whether or not
this has been a "success" for Chile as a whole. Meanwhile, government revenues earned through
the privatization of state assets have been high (yet much lower than they could have been, given
hefty subsidies to purchasers that averaged 40% of the book value of privatized enterprises). But
this temporary and non-sustainable source of income has gone mostly for debt servicing. At the
same time it has resulted in a dramatic concentration of capital and wealth and the transfer of a
huge portion of the Chilean economy from local hands to those of transnational capital. In contrast
to Mexico, or even to neighboring Argentina, where local entrepreneurs and national capital have
been important partners in privatization programs, in Chile the process has involved a more limited
participation of Chilean capital, with the result that de-statizing the economy has been virtually
synonymous with de-nationalizing the economy. Moreover, it should be stressed that the muchtouted inflow of foreign investment in the 1980s did not constitute, in its majority, new productive
investments, but foreign purchases of existing Chilean assets through debt conversion programs.
The IDB's 1992 report notes that such inflows have been drying up "because the international
market price of Chile's foreign debt instruments rose to 90% of their par value, thereby drastically
reducing the profitability of these kinds of operations." In other words, the buy-up spree of Chilean
assets through debt conversion is coming to an end, and with it, the illusion of productive expansion
through this activity. Poverty Management, Not Poverty Elimination It is at the level of what is
called "poverty management" in the neo-liberal jargon, or the social indicators which measure
the actual well-being of Chile's 12 million people, that the real contours of the "success story"
are revealed. What took place in Chile between 1973 and 1990 was exactly what the champions
of the neo-liberal model claim: the management but not the decrease or elimination of poverty.
Throughout this period, wealth became highly concentrated in Chile as overall poverty levels
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sharply increased. Real wages fell 40% between 1973 and 1983. And by 1987, per capita GDP was
barely equal to what it had been in 1970, while per capita consumption was actually 11% lower than
the 1970 level. Health expenditures fell from US$29 per capita in 1973 to US$11 in 1988, with the
result that contagious diseases spread. The rate of typhoid cases, for instance, more than doubled
between 1970 and 1983, and in the 1980s, Chile accounted for 20% of all reported cases of typhoid in
Latin America. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, poverty
levels between 1973 and 1990 increased by 100%. By 1990, 45% of the population was living below
the poverty line. In that same year, nearly one million families out of a total population of about
12.5 million were homeless. The portion considered to be living in total indigence jumped from
8.4% in 1969 to 22.6% in 1987. And as Vuskovic notes, the portion of the GDP accounted for by
wages went from 48% in 1970 (its rough average in the post-WWII years), to over 60% under the
Allende government, and then down to just 38% in 1989. The wealthiest 20% of the population
increased its share of national consumption from 44.5% in 1973 to 59.5% in 1990 (in three years of
the democratic government, it has barely dropped back down to 58.1%). Modern shopping malls
rivalling the most luxurious found in developed countries sprung up in Santiago's plush upper
class neighborhoods in the 1980s and 1990s, at the same time as shantytowns spread like wildfire on
the outskirts of the capital and other Chilean cities, fed by the growing army of those marginalized
and excluded from the "miracle." An Unsustainable Export-Led Development Model Perhaps the
centerpiece of the "miracle" has been the successful reinsertion of Chile into the world market, and
a dramatic expansion of exports, at a time when global markets have been reorganized and a global
economy is emerging. Exports as a proportion of GDP, in fact, soared from 19% in 1984 to 32% in
1988. But the particular pattern has been dynamic growth in a narrow range of "non-traditional"
primary goods exports particularly seafood, lumber, and fruit which, together with the traditional
mining sector, accounted for nearly 90% of exports by the 1990s. Chile has actually experienced deindustrialization over the past 20 years and deepened its historic dependence on primary exports.
This is in sharp contrast to the externally-oriented development models pursued by the "Asian
Tigers," which based their economic strategies on industrialization, the export of manufactured
goods, and an important role for the state in the economy. (This last point is often ignored by those
who highlight the success of the Asian Tigers while simultaneously claiming that state involvement
in the economy should be eliminated.) In his study, Vuskovic notes that such a model is completely
unsustainable. Overexploitation of Chile's maritime resources, which are expected to be depleted
by the next century, has already led to the extinction of several marine species. Timber reserves
are becoming depleted, and overexploitation has helped trigger an ecological disaster. Moreover,
there is heavy foreign participation in these sectors. A major portion of the wealth produced in
these dynamic sectors is thus sent abroad as profit remittances, royalty and patent payments, and
so forth. By way of example, two-thirds of the increase in export earnings produced in 1990 was
transferred abroad. (Of that remaining in Chile, 85% corresponded to capital profits and only 15%
to that retained by the wage sector.) Macroeconomic Equilibrium, But Whose Success? Chile has
indeed achieved outstanding success in two areas: macroeconomic equilibrium, including low
inflation, balanced budgets, stable and "realistic" exchange rates, and so on; and in winning the
confidence of international business and financial networks, which has helped make Chile a new
mecca for transnational capital. Such stability is, without doubt, an important condition for the
health of any economy. But, as is seen in the case of Chile, macroeconomic stability in itself tells
us nothing about the actual well-being of the broad majorities in Latin America. In short, success
and failure are not mutually exclusive; some have benefitted and many have lost out from Chile's
free market program. This has been a "success story" for a minority of Chilean upper and middle
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classes together with international banks and transnational capital operating in Chile's free market
environment. For the broad majority of Chileans who have sunk into ever-deeper impoverishment
and marginalization, what has actually taken place between 1973 and 1993 has been a complete
failure to meet their basic needs. There is a final point: not all government operations are efficient
or productive in Chile's free market system. As part of the "negotiated" transition to democracy,
the military was granted amnesty and given guarantees that it would remain autonomous and well
funded. The armed forces and the incoming civilian government agreed upon a floor for the military
budget, so that it could not fall below the 1989 level of $1.4 billion out of a total budget of $7.7 billion.
In 1989, the military budget was $432 million more than the housing, health and education budgets
combined. Guaranteeing the military such huge economic resources means that there has been
little surplus to attend to the pressing needs of the impoverished majority. It also means that there
is a robust military and police force in place to suppress demands by this majority for changes in
economic policies and social priorities. Is this a model for Latin America and the Third World to
emulate?

-- End --
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